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Abstract 
This paper examines the implications of the institutional designs employed by two types 
of NGOs for the functions performed by indigenous self-help village groups called kafos in The 
Gambia. NGOs were found to be only a partial substitute for the financial and insurance 
functions traditionally performed by these kafos. Institutional duality is, therefore, observed due 
to the coexistence of kafos alongside the NGOs providing the multiple services demanded by 
villagers. The design of NGO programs based on lessons learned from kafos tend to 
complement the kafos, and the villagers seem better served. These fmdings have implications 
for interventions which disrupt but only partially substitute for traditional village arrangements 
and institutions. 
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I. Introduction 
Economists have begun to examine traditional informal village institutions and the 
implications of the coexistence of informal and formal institutions that provide services including 
credit and insurance (Alderman and Paxon; Arnott and Stiglitz). Subsaharan African (SSA) 
countries have a variety of multifunctional informal self-help groups that provide various services 
at the village level (Bouman). Such groups are called kafos in The Gambia. Recently, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), frequently linked to international agencies, have rapidly 
expanded the scale and scope of their village-level operations in fmancial intermediation. While 
the operational designs of kafos are customized to suit the requirements of their members, the 
majority of NGO designs are conceived outside the village. Whereas some NGOs exert a 
presence effect by simply coexisting with kafos, others directly intervene into kafos, exerting an 
intervention effect. 1 While some NGOs follow the savings first and untargeted credit approach, 
others follow the classical supply-leading credit first approach at subsidized rates. The approach 
followed has profound effects on the functions performed and clientele served by the kafos. 
The entry of NGOs into villages as fmancial intermediaries may cause the kafos either 
to disappear or to coexist with the NGOs leading to institutional duality. These developments 
have several distributional implications for the villages. This paper argues that the impact of 
introducing new institutions to resolve economic and social problems depends on their design 
that may either complement or substitute for indigenous village institutions. It provides insights 
about the implications of NGO institutional designs for kafos in The Gambia. The analysis is 
based on a purposive survey conducted in The Gambia on the functions performed by 41 kafos 
in 16 villages where two NGOs with different institutional designs are active. 
1 It has been argued that targeting groups rather than individuals reduces transaction costs 
and repayment problems for lenders (Stiglitz; Varian). Empirical evidence from developing 
countries, however, shows mixed results in loan repayment performance with group lending 
(Huppi and Feder). 
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D. The Conceptual Model 
The kafos in The Gambia are multifunctional, voluntary and usually homogenous in terms 
of members' age, ethnicity, gender and occupation, but have various membership sizes. These 
kafos have evolved from simple age based groups to multifunctional self-help groups that provide 
multiple services including insurance, financial intermediation, labor exchange, and social and 
political services. 2 
Kafos traditionally fill in for missing markets by providing important village services. 
The recent emergence of NGOs with diverse approaches for providing village level fmancial 
intermediation may cause positive or negative externalities on kafos. For example, the NGOs 
may use external funds to make zero interest rate loans directly to individuals or may use the 
kafos as lending conduits. These loans may disrupt the traditional kafos that usually charge a 
positive interest rate on loans made from internally mobilized funds. This could destroy local 
savings mobilization if the villagers become dependent on cheap external funds. 
The entrance of NGOs into villages may cause a shift in the relative importance within 
and among the functions performed by the traditional kafos depending on whether or not the 
NGO fmancial technologies complement or substitute for traditional kafo activities. 
Consequently, kafos may either disappear entirely due to a Darwinian process of complete 
substitution or institutional duality may occur. The NGOs will diminish or displace the kafos 
if their fmancial services are perfect substitutes for the fmancial, insurance and other services 
provided by kafos. Otherwise, institutional duality will occur with the kafos and NGOs 
simultaneously providing multiple services. Alternatively, the NGOs may only complement the 
insurance and fmancial services of kafos so they will continue to perform their traditional 
functions. As a result, institutional duality will emerge with a potentially healthy symbiotic 
relationship between kafos and NGOs resulting in a positive sum welfare game. 
The emergence of NGOs as fmancial intermediaries provides an alternative fmancial 
system for villagers in a country where formal fmancial institutions provide few services in rural 
areas. Channelling fmancial services through kafos may increase their pool of resources and 
improve NGO loan recovery rates and reduce the transaction costs in mobilizing savings 3• In 
this way, NGOs and kafos can be complementary resulting in a positive sum game. NGOs may 
also substitute for some or all of the kafo financial services leading to a more efficient use of 
2 See Nagarajan, Meyer and Ouattara for a discussion about the evolution of kafos in The 
Gambia. 
3 Rural households, especially women engaged in vegetable farming, often save in small 
quantities at frequent intervals (Shipton). The transaction costs involved in mobilizing these 
funds on an individual basis are often high for fmancial intermediaries. A group of savers, such 
as a kafo. can collectively deposit a larger amount and thus reduce transaction costs for the 
fmancial intermediaries. 
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kafo resources in alternative functions. Substitution, however, can be counterproductive if 
NGOs create negative externalities by providing fmancial services that destroy the carefully built 
institutional safeguards of the kafos. They may also contribute to the deterioration or 
discontinuation of traditional kafo insurance mechanisms that are especially useful to marginal 
populations (the elderly, women etc.) but are not offered by the NGOs. For these reasons, the 
specific approaches followed by NGOs in fmancial intermediation can influence traditional 
village institutions with a significant impact on villagers and their communities. 
m. Empirical Evidence from The Gambia 
The objective of this research was to examine the implications of NGOs providing 
fmancial services for the functions of traditional self-help village groups in The Gambia. NGOs 
began offering fmancial services in the late 1980s and presently there are 14 NGOs using diverse 
institutional designs to supply fmancial services in rural and peri-urban villages (Graham et al. ,). 
We selected for study a total of 16 NGO and non-NGO villages, and two NGOs, Centre 
International de Development et de Recherche (CIDR) and Action Aid of the Gambia (AATG), 
that provide fmancial services. These two NGOs are active in rural areas where the majority 
of kafos are found, and their institutional designs are substantially different allowing for 
interesting comparisons. Whereas Action Aid is a nationwide program, the CIDR provides only 
technical assistance to six villages in the Jahally-Pacharr area to set up and operate village 
savings and credit associations (VISACAs). Of the sixteen villages, five are serviced by both 
CIDR and Action Aid while the rest are serviced either by Action Aid alone or by no NGOs 4• 
Data were gathered in two phases in 1991 and 1993 through the rapid appraisal approach and 
selected case studies of kafo activities in the sample villages. 
A. Institutional Design Characteristics of the Action Aid and VISACAs 
Action Aid uses external funds to provide subsidized loans to individuals through village 
kafos. The CIDR provides only technical assistance in the formation of VISACAs and 
encourages the village kafos to participate as clients in these savings and credit programs. We 
hereafter refer to CIDR activities as VISACAs. Action Aid does not mobilize local savings 
since it depends upon external donor funds to provide loans. In sharp contrast, the VISACAs 
rely almost exclusively on internally generated funds through village savings mobilization to 
supply loans to individuals and kafos at village determined interest rates. Furthermore, while 
Action Aid supplies loans only for production purposes and for women, the VISACAs do not 
target any specific loan purpose or clientele group. The VISACAs are owned and operated by 
the villagers and the savings and loan services are based on terms and conditions established in 
village wide assemblies. The terms and conditions for Action Aid loan programs, however, are 
set by external donors. Indeed, the institutional design of the VISACAs closely emulates the 
4 None of the sample villages was serviced by formal fmancial institutions, although three 
were eligible for production credit from the Gambia Cooperative Union. 
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traditional village kafos. Therefore, the VISACAs can be considered endogenous to the village 
while Action Aid is an externally imposed institution. Furthermore, the VISACAs encourage 
the kafos to become members of their associations, while Action Aid directly uses kafos as 
conduits for loans to individual villagers. Therefore, the VISACAs influence kafos by their 
presence while Action Aid influences kafos by its direct intervention into their operations. 
B. The Sample 
A total of 41 kafos engaged in some form of fmancial intermediation and insurance 
functions were identified in the 16 villages and were examined for this study. The survey 
revealed that the kafos were fairly homogenous in member characteristics. Whereas 19 were 
comprised of only men and 14 were comprised of only women, eight were mixed gender. There 
were an average of three kafos per village and they were fairly large with an average 
membership size of 83 members, representing nearly 60 percent of the total adult village 
population (Table 1). 
A classification based on level of NGO participation in the kafos showed that while 15 
were not linked to any NGOs, 26 had some form of NGO involvement. Whereas 13 kafos 
functioned with no direct involvement with VISACAs and Action Aid but only subject to pure 
NGO presence effect in the region, three were subject to the intervention effect from Action Aid 
as conduits for its loans, and ten were subject to both the presence effect from VISACAs and 
the intervention effect from Action Aid through direct NGO involvement (Table 1). The kafo 
functions were clearly influenced by the degree of NGO participation in their activities as will 
be discussed later. 
C. Kafo Functions 
The kafos generally were multifunctional and performed both economic and non-
economic functions. These functions can be broadly classified as: 
a. Insurance 
In general, members (women, men or both) were engaged in a common activity such as 
jointly cultivating a plot of land and contributing the proceeds to a kafo fund primarily used to 
mitigate village level contingencies and, to a lesser extent, individual member contingencies. 
This type of group fund is often used to assist villagers who are economically disadvantaged to 
meet their emergency needs. 
b. Financial intermediation 
Savings were mobilized without interest through regular fixed amount of contributions 
to a group savings fund that was usually nonrotating in nature. Loans to kafo members for 
contingency needs were usually supplied from the fund at a kafo determined interest rate. 
Penalties for non-repayment of loans included social sanctions against the family of the 
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borrower. The accumulated fund was equally divided among members at the end of a specified 
time (ex. ramadan feast). Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are also 
increasingly found within kafos as a subset of their activities. Kafos used as conduits by Action 
Aid had an additional source of funds for lending from Action Aid. These kafos used part of 
these funds for production purposes on their common fields and lent out the rest to individual 
members. 
c. Labor 
Labor was mobilized among kafo members and often hired out during periods of peak 
demand. The proceeds were divided among the members and, to a lesser extent, contributed 
to the kafo fund to meet member and kafo level contingencies. 
d. Social and political 
These included the organization of soccer clubs, village festivals, political rallies, etc. 
Based on the above classification, the activities of the kafos are presented in columns 3 to 6 in 
Table 1 by type of NGO participation in the village. Column four reports the number and 
characteristics of kafos that functioned with no direct involvement with VISA CAs or Action Aid 
but only subject to pure NGO presence effect in the region. Column five provides details on 
kafos subject to the intervention effect from Action Aid as conduits for its loans. Column six 
describes the kafos that were subject to both the presence effect from VISACAs and the 
intervention effect from Action Aid through direct NGO involvement. The first important 
observation is that the traditional kafos did not disappear with the entry of NGOs into the 
villages but continued to coexist with them and continued to perform various activities including 
providing insurance and financial intermediation. This indicates that the fmancial services of 
the NGOs did not fully substitute for the traditional kafo activities. Secondly, the average 
number of kafo activities seems to have increased with the entry of NGOs into the village. The 
kafos in villages without NGOs primarily provided insurance and financial services, and 
temporary kafos were formed to provide labor and socio-political functions. With the emergence 
of NGOs as fmancial intermediaries, the kafos partially shifted from their traditional insurance 
and financial activities into labor and socio-political activities. In addition, since the NGOs were 
only a partial substitute, the kafos continued to perform some insurance and fmancial 
intermediation functions to provide the full range of services demanded by villagers. For 
example, the targeted production loans provided by Action Aid only partially satisfied the 
villager's demand for fmancial services, so kafos fllled in the demand for contingency credit and 
savings services for their members. Thirdly, the observations on kafo sizes based on their type 
of NGO involvement shows no clear pattern. But, women's participation in kafos subject to the 
intervention effect from Action Aid is higher compared to other kafos because Action Aid 
specifically targets women. 
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D. Econometric Analysis and Results 
Regression analysis were performed to explain the implications of NGO institutional 
design on kafo activities. While the VISACA is a village designed, non-interfering institution 
based on self-generated funds, the Action Aid is an externally designed program that directly 
intervenes into kafos with subsidized and targeted credit programs. It is difficult to separate the 
effects of terms and conditions from the intervention and non-intervention policies of the two 
NGOs. The limits on the tractability of the analysis, therefore, confines us to nest the presence 
and intervention effects along with terms and conditions such as interest rate used by NGOs for 
providing fmancial services. Single equation logit models were estimated using the maximum 
likelihood method to examine the factors affecting the insurance and fmancial intermediation 
activities performed by kafos. The dependent variable is dichotomous, taking a value of 1 if the 
kafo performs insurance or financial intermediation, and 0 otherwise. 
The independent variables include the ratio of number of kafo members to total 
population of the village, CONRATIO, and the gender composition of the kafo, GENDER, 
represented by the ratio of female members to total kafo members. The effect of NGO 
involvement is measured by four dummy variables where the value of one represents the 
following: NGOABS indicates absence of NGOs in the village, VISACA and AATG indicates 
involvement of VISACAs or Action Aid with the sample kafo, respectively, and VISAATG 
captures the interaction effect of both VISACA and Action Aid on the sample kafos. The 
regression analysis controls for the AA TG dummy which is incorporated into the constant. The 
targeting of women kafos by Action Aid is represented by GENAATG calculated as the 
interaction between the GENDER and the AATG dummy. 
The regression results are presented in table 2 and the corresponding weighted aggregate 
elasticities in table 3. Significant chi-square values and good R2 values confirm the explanatory 
power of this type of analysis of cross-section data. The signs of the variables are, in general, 
consistent with expectations. Column 2 presents the results for the insurance regressions. The 
negative and significant sign for the variable VISACA confirms the proposition stated earlier that 
the presence of the VISACAs in the villages tend to reduce the insurance functions performed 
by the kafos compared to Action Aid. This indicates that the untargeted loan and saving services 
provided by the VISACAs partially substitute for the insurance functions performed by kafos. 
In contrast, since Action Aid loans were targeted towards production purposes, especially for 
women, kafos have continued to perform their traditional insurance role by providing 
contingency loan and savings services in the villages. The significant, positive and elastic 
coefficient for GENAATG compared to the significant but negative coefficient for GENDER 
further confirms the argument that by targeting women for production loans, the Action Aid fails 
to completely substitute for village insurance functions. 
The regression coefficients for fmancial intermediation presented in column 3 have the 
expected signs but are not significant because there is little variation in the fmancial services 
provided by kafos with various levels of NGO involvement. Table 1 shows that invariably all 
kafos provided financial intermediation services. However, there were shifts within the fmancial 
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services provided by kafos based on the level of NGO involvement. The case studies revealed 
that the economically marginal members of kafos were not directly serviced by either the 
VISACAs or Action Aid. However, access by economically advantaged villagers to untargeted 
loans from the VISACAs may have reduced their crowding out of loans for marginal 
populations. On the other hand, the fact that Action Aid targeted production loans implied that 
villagers had to continue to depend on kafos for contingency loans. This reduced the access to 
loans for economically marginal kafo members. In addition, the borrower screening and 
contract enforcement techniques followed by VISACAs were also adopted by kafos to allocate 
their loan funds and this increased their loan repayment rates from 70% up to 95%. Meanwhile, 
loans made by kafos from funds provided by Action Aid carried few penalties so the recovery 
rate was less than 45%. While the untargeted loans from VISA CAs did not substitute for 
financial services performed by kafos, they complemented the kafos because they are included 
as their members. Since the VISACAs do not intervene into kafo activities and they make 
untargeted loans from locally mobilized deposits at village determined interest rates, they are 
likely to produce positive benefits for kafos. Therefore, the aggregate welfare of the village is 
likely to at least remain unaffected or even increase because of the VISA CA. In contrast, the 
targeted loans made by Action Aid at subsidized interest rates using external funds seem to 
negatively influence kafos by eroding their carefully built institutional safeguards. As a result, 
since Action Aid only partially substitutes for kafo activities, it may well reduce aggregate 
village welfare because the gains realized by some may not offset the losses of others. 
IV. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Kafos have traditionally provided a variety of services including insurance, financial 
intermediation, labor and social and political services in Gambian villages. Recently, NGOs 
following diverse philosophies have expanded rapidly into villages and some are providing 
fmancial services. Whereas some NGOs exert a presence effect by simply coexisting with kafos, 
others directly intervene into kafos, thereby exerting an intervention effect. While some NGOs 
follow the savings first and untargeted credit approach, others follow the classical supply-
leading, subsidized credit first approach. This paper addresses the implications of the 
institutional designs followed by two different NGOs, Action Aid that intervenes into kafos with 
externally imposed terms and conditions for the credit program and VISACAs that is endogenous 
and non-intervening into kafos, for functions performed by traditional village kafo groups. The 
study shows that the fmancial services provided by both Action Aid and VISACAs are only 
partial substitutes for kafo activities, but only VISACAs have positive externality effects on 
kafos in the sample villages. The implication is that institutional designs matters. An externally 
designed institution with a rudimentary financial technology that directly intervenes into 
traditional village structures may be inferior to a non-interfering institution that complements 
traditional village kafos. NGOs need to be cautious in designing their fmancial programs so that 
their actions do not damage the positive attributes of traditional village institutions. 
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Table 1. Characteristics and Activities Performed by Kafos, by NGO Activities. 
NGO Activity 
Presence and 
Items Total Sample No. NGOs Present Presence Effect Intervention Effect Intervention Effect 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) {6) 
1. Number of kafos 41 15 13 3 10 
2. Average number of members 83 46 116 57 104 
a. Avg. male members 28 22 37 0 35 
b. Avg. female members 55 24 79 57 69 
3. Avg. age of kafos (years) 7 6 8 6 5 
4. Activities performed (No. of kafos reporting) 
a. Insurance 31 12 8 3 8 
b. Non-rotating savings_ and credit 31 13 9 3 6 
c. Rotating savings and credit 6 0 2 0 4 
d. Labor 11 2 4 0 5 
e. Socio political 12 0 7 0 5 
5. Total number of activities 91 27 30 6 28 
6. Avg. number of activities/kafo 2.2 1.8 2.3 2.0 2.8 
Table 2. 
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Single Equation Logit Estimates for the Determinants of Insurance and 
Financial Activities of Kafos. 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables Insurance Financial Intermediation 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.209 0.629 
(1.181) (1.071) 
CONRATIO -1.695 4.116 
(4.981) (4.565) 
GENDER -3.096* -1.277 
(2.245) (1.44) 
NGOABS 0.374 1.278 
(1.154) (1.222) 
VISACA -2.477** -0.457 
(1.529) (1.072) 
VISAATG 2.427* -1.506 
(1.673) (1.275) 
GENAATG 3.675** 1.462 
(1.901) (1.582) 
Log -likelihood -18.04 -20.78 
Chi-square 9.47 6.84 
Maddala R2 0.21 0.17 
Asymptotic standard errors given in parentheses. 
**, * represent significance at 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 3. Weighted Aggregate Elasticities for the Determinants of Insurance and 
Financial Activities of Kafos. 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables Insurance Financial Intermediation 
Constant 0.05 0.14 
CONRATIO -0.03 0.15 
GENDER -1.68 -0.16 
NGOABS 0.01 0.07 
VISACA -0.04 -0.05 
VISAATG 0.04 -0.11 
GENAATG 1.71 0.09 
